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Abstract
HSNl, a subtype of influenza A virus that originated in Hong
Kong in 1997 and has since spread across Asia and Africa,
features a reported case fatality rate of nearly 60 percent in
humans. Although naturally-occurring HSN1 has not developed the ability to be efficiently transmitted from human to
human, two independent research teams have recently
mutated strains of the virus, resulting in facile transmission
among laboratory ferrets, which are considered the most
accurate models for humans in viral studies. As a
consequence of the security and public health risks of such
information, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity recommended that Science and Nature refrain
from publishing full versions of the research manuscripts.
The move has provided a platform for international debate
as scientists assess the potential benefits and hazards as a
consequence of either disseminating all details of the studies
or only a select few.
Introduction
The possibility of a major influenza pandemic represents a
significant threat to the livelihood of people around the
world. Influenza pandemics usually occur when a new strain
of influenza, to which the population lacks immunity, can
spread more quickly and infect larger numbers of people
than the seasonal influenza virus. 1 Recently, the HSNl subtype of influenza has been of major concern. HSNl is an extremely virulent form of avian influenza that has developed
the ability to infect humans.2 The first recorded case of human infection with H5N1 occurred in Hong Kong, China, during 1997. The virus became widespread during 2003 and
2004, with reported cases stretching from Asia to Africa.3.4 As
the virus continues to spread farther across the globe, and
the possibility of mutations exists, the threat to public health
continues to increase significantly.
Descriptions of the clinical course for this virus are predominantly based on case reports from patients hospitalized with
H5N1 infections. Patients commonly present with a fever of
greater than 38°C and other symptoms similar to more common influenza strains such as diarrhea, vomiting, chest or
abdominal pain, as well as non-traditional symptoms, including bleeding from the nose or gums.2-3 One distinguishing
characteristic of H5N1 infection from other strains of influenza may be the incubation period prior to presentation of
symptoms. H5N1 has been shown to have an incubation period of two to eight days compared to two to three days for
common influenza strains. Risk factors for contracting H5N1
appear to largely be contained to exposure to infected poul-
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try or an environmental fomite that may have been in contact
with infected fowl.2 There is little evidence to suggest that
individuals can become infected by consuming poultry that
has been properly cooked or prepared or from everyday human-to-human contact if appropriate precautions are
takenP Due to the similar symptomology with other strains
of influenza, appropriate lab tests such as HS-specific RNA or
viral isolation are required for definitive H5N1 diagnosis.3
The majority of epidemiologic data related to H5N1 are also
derived from patient case reports, most of which originate
from countries across Africa and Asia, where HSN1 has
spread since the initial human case in China in 1997.3,4 As of
2012, a total of 583 confirmed human cases have been reported to the World Health Organization (WHO), resulting in
344 deaths associated with the virus.s The extremely high
case fatality rate associated with H5N1 makes identifying
appropriate drug therapy options to treat infected patients
paramount. However, due to the small number of human
H5N1 cases, no randomized clinical trials have been conducted to identify the preferred treatment.6 Currently, the
treatment of choice is an oral neuraminidase inhibitor such
as oseltamivir (Tamiflu@).3,6 Neuraminidase inhibitors block
the release of new viral particles from infected host cells,
thereby preventing the propagation of influenza virus within
the host.7 In an attempt to develop a formalized treatment
guideline for HSNl, the WHO recommended that the seasonal influenza treatment regimen of oseltamivir 75 mg
twice daily for five days be used for HSNl as well.6 However,
researchers have suggested that higher doses may be necessary to adequately treat such a virulent strain of influenza.3,6
All patients with suspected H5N1 infections should be hospitalized in isolation to reduce the risk of spread to other individuals.3 Despite clinicians' best efforts to treat HSN1 with
currently available antiviral drugs, resistance to oseltamivir
therapy and overall mortality remain high. Given the lack of
effective treatment, the development of natural or laboratory
-induced mutations that allow for extensive human-tohuman transmission is a major concern.
Humans possess several defense mechanisms to combat the
possibility of infection with influenza. Therefore, a pandemic
involving H5Nl may be closely linked to the development of
several specific mutations that lead to greater transmissibility in humans.a One such mutation, found in the polymerase
complex of viral genes, allows for increased replication of the
virus in human tissue. Laboratory analysis of H5N1 isolates
has shown that this mutation may already be present in the
virus, representing a major step toward pandemic potential.
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However, without the presence of an additional mutation in
the amino acid sequence that codes for the hemagglutinin
(HA) protein of the avian virus, allowing it to bind more easily to cells in the human respiratory tract, the likelihood of a
large-scale pandemic and human-to-human viral transmission remains low.a To date, none of the naturally occurring
mutations in viral HA have resulted in widespread human-tohuman transmission. Concerns regarding the development of
such mutations artificially in a laboratory setting and the
subsequent publishing of data have been a major topic of
recent discussions in the scientific community.

Current Discussions
Twenty HSNl clades, all sharing the HS hemagglutinin (HA)
gene but otherwise differing in genotype as a result of evolutionary processes, have been identified and classified since
2008; although these naturally-occurring strains of HSNl are
not currently easily transmissible among humans, prominent
influenza research teams led by Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison and the University of Tokyo
and Dr. Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, have independently developed genetically mutated variants whose alterations impart efficient
spreading of the virus in ferrets, the laboratory animals considered to be the most accurate models of humans in studies
of viral transmission and virulence.9-1 1 Genetically modified
HSNl strains possessing an altered HA protein were able to
spread rapidly among the rodents and the viruses in Fouchier's studies proved particularly lethal, a trait also observed
in the viruses produced by Kawaoka's team, albeit to a lesser
extent.11 These discoveries may advance the scientific community's understanding of the mechanisms by which viruses
gain the ability to spread from human to human, as the present lack of details of such pathogenesis represents a significant obstacle in preventing possible pandemics.10
The information from these studies would allow researchers
to investigate preemptive means to decrease the risk of
transmission of the virus among humans, including the development of more advanced vaccines and surveillance protocols and delineation of appropriate countermeasures. For
these reasons, the researchers submitted manuscripts of
their work to the journals Nature and Science in late 2011.1 2
In response to the sensitive content of the papers, the U.S.
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)
requested on December 20, 2011, that the journals censor
certain components of the articles.11.13,14 The NSABB, established in 2004 as a result of the 2001 anthrax bioattacks in
the eastern part of the United States, serves as a "federal advisory committee chartered to provide advice, guidance and
leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research, defined as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to
public health and/or national security."13 The board, currently chaired by microbiologist Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University, made the unprecedented recommendation
that Nature and Science publish the conclusions of the submitted manuscripts but refrain from including "the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the
experiments by those who would seek to do harm."14 The
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move has since sparked intense debate among members of
the scientific, security and public health communities.
Realizing the complexity of the multiple perspectives of
those involved, both Kawaoka and Fouchier announced on
January 20, 2012, that for 60 days, their laboratories would
voluntarily postpone their research regarding experimental
mutations that confer transmission among mammals and
involve live HSNl or HS HA reassortant viruses previously
observed to be transmissible in ferrets but would continue to
study naturally occurring strains.10 This halt would allow
time for international forums to discuss the implications of
publication or lack thereof of the studies. In mid-February
2012, 22 scientists and personnel of Nature and Science convened in Geneva, ultimately deciding that partial publication
of the studies would not be beneficial to further research and
extending the moratorium on investigation of laboratorydeveloped HSNl strains.12

Scientific Review Process
One key component of international discussion of this issue
is how sensitive material in medical literature is scrutinized
and considered for publication by the NSABB. The NSABB is
responsible for many tasks, including providing guidelines
for the identification, review, conduction and communication
of dual use research.IS These guidelines can be found in the
NSABB publication "Proposed Framework for the Oversight
of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing
the Potential Misuse of Research Information."I6 One specific
purpose of the NSABB is to "advise on policies governing
publication, public communication and dissemination of dual
use research methodologies and results."16 In summary, the
NSABB committee analyzes the risks and benefits of dual use
research and formulates a recommendation on proper dissemination of the material based on content, timing and distribution.is The NSABB aims to consider both the importance
of the advancement within the scientific community as well
as the concerns of national security, particularly minimizing
the risk of the misuse of said information. Is
In regard to the HSNl experiments conducted by Kawaoka
and Fouchier, the NSABB analyzed the researchers' two scientific papers concerning the respiratory transmission of the
virus from mammal to mammal. After meeting with several
experts in the field of influenza research and public health,
NSABB personnel determined that the potential benefits of
publishing the research did not outweigh the possible negative consequences associated with disseminating complete
versions of the manuscripts. The NSABB's recommendation
to Science and Nature to refrain from publishing the methodology of the studies so it could not be duplicated while still
allowing the publication of other scientifically relevant information was also endorsed by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), which provided a portion of the research funding.11 Specifically, NSABB asked that details related to the
specific amino acid changes that lead to the virus's transmissibility be removed.17 Government bodies, including the
NIH's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID) and the WHO, have also contributed to the discussion, as well as news media such as National Public Radio
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(NPR), which facilitate microcosms of needed forums.
A virus as lethal as HSN1, which has a documented case fatality rate of nearly 60 percent in humans who have contracted
the disease, is one to be handled with constant vigilance and
the utmost care, especially when that virus has been modified in the laboratory to impart efficient transmission among
animals that are considered the prototypical model for pathology in humans.s,1 7,is NSABB board members and other
advisory personnel emphasize such facts as supporting evidence for the request for censorship. The suggestion has
been made that full versions of the papers be selectively distributed so that only approved personnel investigating the
HSN1 virus have access to "dual use" information.12 However, ensuring the integrity of the means by which the manuscripts are promulgated is a process without current clarity.
Alternatively, researchers argue that it is highly unlikely that
a ferret-adapted influenza virus could be used for bioterrorism.19 For instance, knowing the amino acid changes required for transmission in the ferret does not directly enable
the production of a biological weapon.19 Furthermore, many
live attenuated vaccines have been produced by using animals models, including ferrets, and the benefits of releasing
the information for this purpose have proven to be vast.19,20
Other proponents state that it is also unknown whether a
virus that will replicate in and transmit among ferrets would
possess the same abilities in humans.20 Therefore, one cannot directly extrapolate this data to make predictions about a
human host. While some scientists cite academic freedom as
the primary reason to fully disseminate the information, others advocate for the potential advances in the understanding
of virology and preventing or controlling such devastating
pathogens that could result from unabridged publication.
In contrast, others contend that the decision to leave out key
information in the methodology was the correct form of action. This virus is highly lethal in humans, more so than the
influenza virus responsible for the 1918 pandemic that killed
50 million people, and if a strain gained efficient human -tohuman transmission, the consequences could be severe.2 1
Recently, Keim discussed his reasoning behind the NSABB
recommendation. He stated that the committee "carefully
considered how restricting the information would compromise scientific research progress and even how it would hinder public health efforts to prevent such a horrific pandemic."22 He also asserted that "the short term negative consequences of restricting experimental details seemed small
in contrast to the large consequences of facilitating the replication of these experiments by someone with nefarious intent."22 Keim also noted that the NSABB consists of actively
practicing scientists who agree with the promotion of the
publication of scientific research and that "the recommendation not to publish scientific results was highly unusual and
the first such recommendation by the NSABB membership."22
Following the guidelines set by the NSABB, they determined
that the research had the potential to be dangerous and recommended the restriction of the publication of the manuscripts.
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Conclusion
As researchers continue discussions, both the WHO and the
U.S. government are working to develop policies and guidelines for the distribution of restricted information. Balancing
scientific discovery and medical advancement with potential
threats to public safety is a contentious issue that harbors
significant, widespread implications; much progress is
needed to ensure that the world's population is protected not
only from naturally-occurring pathogens but also from those
developed by individuals who seek to manipulate such viruses for bioterrorism.
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